LIMITING OR EXCLUDING LIABILITY IN THE AUSTRALIAN FITNESS INDUSTRY

BY JOACHIM DIETRICH

BOND UNIVERSITY
BRINGING AMBITION TO LIFE
Table Of Contents

[1.0] Introduction 1-2

[2.0] Contract Exclusion Issues 3

[2.1] Introduction 3

[2.2] Incorporation 3-6

[2.3] Unfair Contract Terms 6-8

[2.4] Minors 8-11
[1.0] Introduction

The concept of risk management in the fitness industry can refer to at least two, quite different, mechanisms for minimising risk. One of these mechanisms is to control programmatic risks such as accidents or injuries that can arise from the fitness services provided by the fitness service providers. The most desirable means of controlling programmatic risks for fitness service providers would be the minimisation of the accidents and injuries by providing reasonably safe services in line with the best practices in the fitness industry.

The second type of risk management mechanism is to control the financial risks pertaining to the costs of legal claims in negligence resulting from the occurrence of programmatic risks, in other words, minimising the financial consequences that may flow from programmatic risks. This is commonly done by either or both of two means. First, one can minimise the financial risks of accidents or injuries by minimising the likelihood of legal liability being imposed after an injury. This can be done by means of contract terms that exclude or limit legal liability, that is, contractual exclusion clauses, or ‘waivers’ or ‘disclaimers’ as they are commonly called in the fitness and recreational sport industry (though the strict legal meanings of these terms differ to their more common usage and the most accurate legal descriptor of contract terms that exclude or limit liability is ‘exemption’ or ‘exception’ clauses).

Importantly, as we shall see below, there are significant risks associated with such clauses and they may not be effective in achieving the aim that is sought to be achieved. Unless carefully drafted and appropriately provided to a client, such clauses may not in fact exclude, avoid or limit the legal liability, even where the law permits such exclusion clauses.1 As Dr JoAnn Eickhoff-Shemek has observed:

[waivers] should never be relied upon as the sole risk management strategy. They do nothing to help prevent injuries and the subsequent claims and lawsuits that may follow...it is the ultimate responsibility of co-ordinators,

1 As to when such clauses are permitted under consumer protection laws, see Report on Liability Arising from Contract, [3.3].
managers, and owners of health fitness facilities to ensure that their staff members are adhering to this duty on a daily basis. 

Secondly, it is possible to minimise the financial risks of legal liability by means of third party liability insurance to cover against the financial impact of ‘successful’ legal claims or actions by injured clients. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, such insurance is compulsory for some fitness providers, as was noted above.

It should be borne in mind, however, that both of these risk management strategies do not do anything to prevent or reduce the number or severity of accidents and injuries. They can only reduce the likelihood of adverse findings of legal liability (that is, by means of exclusion clauses) or else reduce the financial impact of such legal liability (by means of insurance). Even where they are successful in achieving those aims, there are still potentially negative consequences that may result from adverse health outcomes from accidents, in particular from accidents caused by negligence.

In particular, the goodwill and reputation of a business or even a whole industry may be negatively affected, leading to loss of existing and prospective clients and eventually less profitability. For example, if serious accidents frequently occur from white-water rafting adventure tours, either individual providers of such services may become unprofitable, or the industry as a whole may become unprofitable. There are also other potential negative consequences resulting from unsafe services, such as increased insurance premiums and prosecutions under workplace health and safety laws.

For these reasons, although it is desirable that the fitness industry use the two financial risk-management strategies discussed here, they in no way reduce the need for adopting industry best practices and implementing risk management strategies to provide reasonably safe services.

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[2.0] Contract Exclusion Issues

[2.1] Introduction

Although the law of contract is critical if a fitness service provider seeks to use an exclusion clause against a legal claim for a personal injury, it should be noted that the ‘ordinary law of contract presents various significant obstacles’ to the limitation or exclusion of liability in general.

In this context, three issues arise: (1) is the clause a part of the contract, that is, has it been incorporated as a term of the contract (‘incorporation’); (2) does it effectively exclude the liability that arises in the circumstance, that is, does the natural meaning of the clause cover the circumstances (‘interpretation’); and (3) if the exclusion clause has been incorporated and excludes the liability in question, can an argument be made that the contract is, as a result, unfair, and hence able to be challenged under consumer protection laws dealing with ‘unfair contracts’. We will consider each of these issues in turn.

[2.2] Incorporation

The law on the incorporation of exclusion clauses into contracts is not straightforward. Where an ostensibly contractual document has been signed, there is a presumption that its terms are binding, even where the parties have not read the terms and conditions. For example, in Totman v Pyramid Riding Stables Ltd, an exclusion clause was incorporated by the parties’ signature in relation to a contract for horse-riding services.

Nonetheless, an exclusion clause may not be binding if the signed document is not, on its face and from its appearance, contractual in nature. For example, in Lormine Pty Ltd & Anor v Xuereb, a document containing an exclusion clause signed by the

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4 See the High Court of Australia decision in Toll (FGCT) Pty Limited v Alphapharm Pty Limited [2004] HCA 52; (2004) 219 CLR 165; 211 ALR 342; the case reaffirmed earlier statements of the rule in cases such as L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394. See also E Peden and J W Carter, ‘Incorporation of Terms by Signature: L'Estrange Rules!’ (2005) 21 Journal of Contract Law 96.
5 (1992) 132 AR 332 (Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench).
passenger of a cruise was held not to be contractual in intent. The document had been represented as being about ‘passenger numbers’. Further, an exclusion clause may not be binding, or may not take effect to the full extent of its terms, if there has been any misrepresentation as to its effect or meaning.

Where a contract has not been signed or, if it has, the term that is sought to be relied on is not part of that signed document, then further difficulties in incorporation arise. Incorporation by notice may be difficult, especially where the term is particularly harsh and oppressive. This is illustrated by cases concerning terms on tickets, or on notices.

Even if the clause is part of the contract, the courts have traditionally taken a cautious approach to interpreting exclusion clauses widely. In theory, a clause of a contract can exclude liability for almost any type of breach (but cannot exclude statutory consumer protection provisions, except in the terms of the statute) as long as its natural meaning encompasses such breach or conduct, particularly where the contract is a commercial agreements entered into between business people. As a practical matter, however, it would need to be well drafted and unambiguously expressed. This is all the more so where the contract is one entered into by a client or consumer and a business entity. Clauses are not effective to exclude liability for negligence, or for a serious breach of contract, unless the words unambiguously encompass such conduct. Thus, in Mouritz v Hegedus, a clause stating that a service provider would not be held ‘responsible in any way’ in case of accident,

7 See, eg, Curtis v Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co [1951] 1 KB 805.
8 See, however, Bright v Sampson & Duncan Enterprises Pty Ltd (1995) 1 NSWLR 346.
10 See, eg, Darlington Futures Ltd v Delco Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 500.
11 It should be noted that s 5N(3) of the CLA (NSW), and s 5J(3) of the CLA (WA), make it easier for service providers to exclude liability; stating that participants engage in an activity at their ‘own risk’ is deemed to be effective as a waiver. These sections are at present redundant however, since they only allow for the exclusion of contractual implied terms and not the statutory guarantee of due care and skill under s 60 ACL. See Report on Liability Arising from Contract, [3.3]-[3.4].
12 Unreported, Western Australia Full Court of the Supreme Court, Kennedy, Ipp and Owen JJ, 19 April 1999. The decision must be questioned, however, because of some of its reasoning, in particular, the reference to notions of ‘fundamental breaches’ of contract that do not form part of Australian law. See also the contrasting views of Mahoney P and Cole J as to the operation of the exclusion clause in John Dorahy’s Fitness Centre Pty Ltd v Buchanan (Unreported, Court of Appeal of New South Wales, Mahoney P, Cole JA and Cohen AJA, 18 December 1996); and compare Neil v Fallon (1995) Aust Torts Reports 81-321.
damage or any other mishap, was not sufficient to exempt the service provider for liability for the fundamental breach that had occurred.

Another example in which the defendants attempted to rely on an – as it turns out, badly drafted – exclusion clause is Belna Pty Ltd v Irwin. In that case, Belna Pty Ltd (owner of Fernwood Fitness Centres) relied on a clause in the contract between Belna Pty Ltd and Ms Irwin, that stated:

It is my expressed interest in signing this agreement, to release Fernwood Fitness Centre, its Directors, Franchises, Officers, Owners, Heirs and assigns from any and all claims for professional or general liability, which may arise as a result of my participation, whether fault may be attributed to myself or its employees. I understand that I am totally responsible for my own personal belongings whilst at the Centre. I also understand that each member or guest shall be liable for any property damage and/or personal injury while at the Centre.

The judgment of Ipp JA devoted little time to the interpretation of this clause, in part because it failed on so many fronts adequately to exclude liability. The use of the term ‘release’ was inappropriate: it is a technical legal term that generally applies to a plaintiff ‘releasing’ another for a liability that has already occurred, rather than one that applies to exclusion of future liability that may occur. In other words, the statements: ‘I will exclude you from liability for any breaches of your contract over the next two years’ or ‘I am releasing you from your liability for the breach of your contract that occurred last week’ are meaningful and clear statements; whereas a statement such as ‘I will release you from any breaches of your contract in the future’ is not. Other difficulties included the use of the phrase ‘my expressed interest’ which the Court considered to be a concept of ‘indeterminate meaning’; and the phrase ‘claims for professional or general liability’ did not necessarily encompass negligence. The Court agreed with the conclusion that ‘[t]he clause is not merely ambiguous, it is likely unintelligible’ and that it was ‘so vague as to be meaningless’. What is evident here is that the Court sought to interpret the terms in the clause in a

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14 See [2009] NSWCA 46, [38].
15 Ibid, [39].
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, [40].
technical way, giving them their legal, strict or narrow meanings, even though it may have been drafted (perhaps deliberately) using broad and loose language.

[2.3] Unfair Contract Terms

As part of the ACL, all jurisdictions now have provisions that allow for remedies in relation to unfair contract terms (Part 2-3 ACL). Specifically, an ‘unfair term of a consumer contract’ is void under s 23 and compensation for loss and other remedial orders can be sought (see, for example, s 237 and s 239 ACL). Such a term must be contained in a ‘standard form contract’ under s 27. Any contract that is alleged to be a standard form contract is presumed to be so (s 27(1)). Given the sort of factors that are relevant to a determination of whether a contract is a standard form contract (s 27(2)), the vast majority of fitness membership agreements or, more broadly, recreational service contracts, are likely to be standard form consumer contracts.

The question that thus arises is as follows: even where an exclusion clause is permitted by s 139A CCA, can an injured consumer argue that the clause is an ‘unfair term’ under Part 2-3 ACL? Taking s 24 first:

24 Meaning of unfair

(1) A term of a consumer contract is unfair if:
   (a) it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract; and
   (b) it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term; and
   (c) it would cause detriment (whether financial or otherwise) to a party if it were to be applied or relied on.

(2) In determining whether a term of a consumer contract is unfair under subsection (1), a court may take into account such matters as it thinks relevant, but must take into account the following:
   (a) the extent to which the term is transparent;
   (b) the contract as a whole.

(3) A term is transparent if the term is:
   (a) expressed in reasonably plain language; and
   (b) legible; and
   (c) presented clearly; and
   (d) readily available to any party affected by the term.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), a term of a consumer contract is presumed not to be reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term, unless that party proves otherwise.
Critically, two relevant considerations listed in s 25(1) (‘Examples of unfair terms’) could be used to support the view that a wide-ranging exclusion, of itself, is unfair:

(a) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) to avoid or limit performance of the contract; …
   (i) a term that limits, or has the effect of limiting, one party’s vicarious liability for its agents …

Paragraph (a) is ambiguous. It could refer only to terms that avoid or limit a party’s obligation to perform the contract and thus only preclude contracts of a type that allow a party a choice as to whether it performs its obligation or not.\(^{18}\) Alternatively, it could also include contract terms that exclude or limit secondary obligations to pay damages for breach. If the courts were to adopt the latter interpretation, then exclusion clauses can clearly be challenged on this ground. Further, it is probably not uncommon for exclusion clauses to seek to limit one party’s vicarious liability, within para 25(1)(i).

Alternatively, leaving aside challenges based on substantive unfairness, it may be possible to demonstrate procedural unfairness from the circumstances in which a contract is entered into. There is little case law on the topic in Australia dealing with exclusion clauses, though some cases have arisen under the Contracts Review Act 1980 (NSW).\(^{19}\) For example, in *John Dorahy’s Fitness Centre Pty Ltd v Buchanan*,\(^{20}\) the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that a wide-ranging exclusion clause in a fitness centre contract was ‘unjust’ in its width of operation when considered alongside the circumstances in which the contract had been entered. Mahoney P noted that the mere fact that a contract contains an exclusion clause does not render it ‘unjust’: ‘there are legitimate commercial reasons’ for including such a provision.\(^{21}\) Nonetheless, Mahoney P focussed both on the substantively unfair operation of the clause (its width) and factors such as that the document was

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\(^{18}\) Cf *MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA)* (1975) 133 CLR 125. We are referring here to what is legally called the primary obligation to perform, as compared to the secondary obligation to pay damages to compensate for losses incurred as a result of a failure to perform.

\(^{19}\) Incidentally, that Act continues to operate despite the additional (though narrower) unfair terms provisions of the ACL.

\(^{20}\) Unreported, Court of Appeal of New South Wales, Mahoney P and Cohen AJA, Cole JA dissenting, 18 December 1996.

\(^{21}\) Ibid, 14.
tendered without explanation or expectation that the customer would read it.\footnote{Ibid, 15.}
Interestingly, the Court reached the conclusion that the exclusion clause was unjust even in the absence of relevant factors such as those in paras (a) and (i) of s 25(1) ACL (set out above) being included in the \textit{Contracts Review Act}.

That decision can be compared with \textit{Gowan v Hardie}\footnote{[1991] NSWCA 126.} where the existence of a wide-ranging exclusion clause was not a factor that on its own rendered the contract ‘unjust’ in the circumstances (a trainee parachutist suffering injury from defendants’ negligence). There was no procedural unfairness on entry into the contract and the term was clear and unambiguous.\footnote{A fruitful source of arguments and relevant judicial decision-making might be found in cases under the English \textit{Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977}. Under that Act, courts have in some circumstances deemed clauses excluding liability for negligence as ‘unfair’. See, eg, Elizabeth Macdonald, \textit{Exemption Clauses and Unfair Terms}, Butterworths, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed, 1999, 198-99, 203-204.}

To summarise, the new unfair terms Part of the ACL is another source of uncertainty: novel legal arguments can be made seeking to strike down a contract or a clause of a contract because it purports to exclude, in wide-ranging circumstances, liability for breach of the contract or for torts. Such arguments would seek to overcome the effects of s 139A CCA that permits exclusion clauses. It adds a further level of complexity and uncertainty to the legal position and could lead to litigation.

\section*{[2.4] Minors}

One further issue needs to be addressed, one that arises even where an exclusion clause has been successfully incorporated into a contract and is sufficiently clearly worded to exclude liability for the type of negligent conduct engaged in by the supplier of the fitness services. In such cases, at least adult parties who suffer personal injury as a result of negligent conduct will not be able to bring a claim, in tort, for breach of the ACL statutory guarantees, or for breach of contract, in relation to such injury. The question that arises is: what if the injured party was a minor, that is, less than 18 years old?

Minors do not have contractual capacity, that is, they are not bound by contracts. As a consequence of this fundamental common law principle, contracts entered into by minors, with some exceptions, are unenforceable against them. The precise legal
position is complicated by varying statutory amendments to the common law in some jurisdictions, and a wholesale legislative approach in New South Wales. For present purposes, it suffices to summarise the general common law principles that apply in all jurisdictions (since the statutory amendments have no impact on the issues here under consideration). The position under the New South Wales legislation appears to be similar and will not be further noted.

Under general common law principles, a minor does not have capacity to contract unless the contract is one for necessary goods or (relevantly here) beneficial services. Further, even if the contract is for ‘necessaries’, such as a contract for transportation to and from work, the contract as a whole must be of benefit to the minor.

For example, in Flower v London and North Western Railway Company, a contract for the necessary transportation of a minor to and from work was nonetheless not binding upon him as it was detrimental. Specifically, the contract had sought to exclude the liability of the railway company for any accident, injury or losses occasioned by the company, even by their negligence. Exceptionally, if a contract as a whole is of benefit, then an exclusion clause may be held to be binding against the minor, such as where common law liability is excluded alongside provisions for no-fault insurance cover in a contract of employment.

In any case, it will be a rare situation where a contract for fitness services will be considered necessary at least where recreation is one reason for undertaking such activities unless, perhaps, the services relates to something like the provision of

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26 In New South Wales, the position under the *Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970* would not appear to be different to that set out below: although contracts generally beneficial to a minor are binding, it is doubtful whether a service contract containing a wide-ranging exclusion clause would be so, especially where the services are of a recreational nature. See generally, D Healey, ‘Disclaimers, Exclusion Clauses, Waivers and Liability Release Forms in Sport: Can They Succeed in Limiting Liability?’ in M Fewell (ed), *Sports Law A Practical Guide*, LBC Information Service, 1995, 210-212, and cases discussed there, and Carter and Harland, above n 25, [1526] ff; N Seddon and M Ellinghaus, *Cheshire and Fifoot’s Law of Contract* (LexisNexis Butterworths, 9th ed, 2008), [17.43]-[17.50].
28 [1894] 2 QB 65. See also Keays v Great Southern Railway Co [1941] IR 534, and Harnedy v National Greyhound Racing Company Ltd [1944] IR 160. In a case not dealing with exclusion clauses, Fawcett v Smeathurst (1914) 84 LJKB 473, a term of a contract imposing strict liability for loss of a car in a (necessary) car hire contract rendered the contract too onerous and hence unenforceable.
29 See *Clements v London & North Western Railway Co* [1894] 2 QB 483.
educational holiday camps, or sports training, or fitness classes engaged in for medical reasons. Even if such contracts were considered for necessaries, the presence of exclusion clauses almost certainly renders them not ones that as a whole are for the benefit of minors.

If a contract of service is not binding against the minor, such a contract is nonetheless binding against the provider and the minor can sue for breach of such contract\(^{30}\) or else will be able to proceed with a tort claim in negligence by avoiding the contract containing the waiver clause.

It could be argued that one way around this difficulty is for the parent or guardian of a minor to sign a contract on their behalf. However, such a contract entered into by a service provider and a parent of a minor (to whom the services are provided) is not prima facie binding on the minor. Not being a party to the contract, the rules of privity of contract apply: generally speaking, the concept of privity of contract means that only those who have entered into the contract are bound by its terms.\(^{31}\)

One way around the privity problem is to argue that parents are acting as agents for minors on whose behalf they contract. However, the mere status of parent (or guardian) does not carry with it any general power to act on the minor’s behalf.\(^{32}\)

There appears to be little authority on the point, but Young J affirmed this position in *Homestake Gold of Australia Ltd v Peninsula Gold Pty Ltd*.\(^{33}\) Further, even though minors have power at common law\(^{34}\) to appoint agents, the acts of such agents have no greater validity against the minor than they would have if the minor had acted on his or her own behalf.\(^{35}\)

Ultimately, there is simply no legal basis on which parents can enter into contracts on behalf of minors that the minor could not enter into themselves.

\(^{30}\) See Carter and Harland, above n 25, [808]; Seddon and Ellinghaus, above n 26, [17.34].

\(^{31}\) Statutory exceptions to the privity rule, allowing third parties to enforce benefits promised under a contract, such as under s 55 *Property Law Act 1974* (Qld), are obviously not applicable in their terms in these circumstances: the service provider in seeking to rely on a waiver is imposing a burden on the minor by taking away common law rights (to sue in torts).

\(^{32}\) See Harland, above n 27, [201].

\(^{33}\) (1996) 131 FLR 447 at 456. See also the comments of Bryson JA (Beazley JA agreeing) in *Ohlstein bht Ohlstein & 3 Ors v E & T Lloyd trading as Oxford Farm Trail Rides* [2006] NSWCA 226 [170].

\(^{34}\) See also s 46 *Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970* (NSW).

\(^{35}\) Harland, n 27 above, [508]-[509].
Thus, apart from arguments based on the lack of privity or authority, it is the underlying basis for the incapacity rule itself, namely the protection of those who are otherwise vulnerable, that provides the strongest arguments against exclusion clauses or waivers being enforceable against minors, even when signed by competent adults on their behalf.

One way in which recreational service providers might seek to overcome these difficulties when dealing with minors is to require parents to sign an indemnity agreement. The terms of such an agreement would require the parents to indemnify the provider against any damages or losses arising from a claim by the minor against the provider. Obviously, if valid, such an indemnity could well significantly reduce the incidence of litigation against service providers by minors. Although I am not aware of any Australian authority on point, one must question the validity of any such indemnity, however. It can be argued that it is contrary to public policy to deprive minors, in effect and for most practical purposes, of their legal rights by such a backdoor means. As far as I am aware, such indemnity agreements are not uncommonly used in the recreational context and, no doubt, litigation on their validity will be forthcoming.36

36 See, eg, the parent/guardian approval clause in the terms of entry to the Coolangatta Gold Event: http://eventdesq.imgstg.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=RegisterAdd1&EventDesqID=560&OrgID=1366; and also the waiver and indemnity in respect of minors clause in the Declaration, Waiver and Indemnity Agreement for the South Australian City to Bay event: http://www.city-bay.org.au/pdf/Indemnity.pdf.